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I.

INTRODUCTION

In June of 2006, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its second decision in five years concerning the regulatory
jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
1
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Section 404
gives the Corps discretionary power, through a permitting process,
to allow or disallow the discharge of dredged or fill material into
2
“waters of the United States” by private individuals and companies.
3
Rapanos v. United States involves the filling of wetlands for
commercial purposes, as do the only other two Supreme Court
4
decisions involving section 404.
The issue in Rapanos has been one of the most litigated in the
short thirty-five year history of the CWA—to what extent may the
Corps assert its regulatory jurisdiction? In other words, how far did
Congress intend the term “waters of the United States” to reach?
The constitutional limit to the power that Congress may delegate to
the Corps extends no further than the limitations of the Interstate
5
Commerce Clause, which forms the basis for the Executive’s
regulatory power over pollution in general. Before Rapanos and its
predecessor five years earlier, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
6
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), it seems
that most federal judges—district court and circuit court alike—
would have interpreted the language of the CWA broadly to extend
all the way to the limits of the Commerce Clause. A small but vocal
minority of judges, however, disputed this interpretation and would
have strictly construed the CWA’s language to limit the Corps’s
jurisdiction to only those waters that are truly interstate. What is
undisputed is the fact that after Rapanos and SWANCC, a majority of
Supreme Court Justices will not allow an overly broad
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
2. The term “waters of the United States” and the term “navigable waters”
are used interchangeably in this Article because the CWA gives them the same
meaning. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
3. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
4. The other two Supreme Court cases discussing section 404 of the CWA
are United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), and Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159 (2001). The later case is generally referred to as the “SWANCC” case and both
are discussed in depth below.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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interpretation of the CWA. The result being, from an ecological
standpoint, the loss of even more wetlands to agriculture and
development because those wetlands that are not under federal
control fall to the states for regulation, and the states have
historically done a poor job at preserving wetlands.
This Article will show, through a historical analysis of federal
waters/wetlands jurisprudence, that Rapanos and SWANCC were
wrongly decided, representing a sudden shift away from prior
waters/wetlands precedent that sought to give maximum control to
the Executive to prevent pollution and preserve our nation’s
aquatic ecological resources. This Article will first present some
background information relating to wetlands, with an added focus
7
on Minnesota wetlands. Second, it will discuss the early expansion
of the term “waters of the United States” as the basis for federal
8
control over water pollution. Third, this Article will show how the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA), through a series of
increasingly liberal court of appeals and Supreme Court decisions,
came to be used for the regulation of industrial water pollution,
even though it was initially passed only to prevent navigational
9
blockages in open waters. Fourth, this Article will outline the CWA
provisions that are pertinent to wetlands, discussing them in the
context of overdue congressional action on the need for
comprehensive water pollution legislation, action which the
10
judiciary had been pressing for all along. Fifth, this Article will
analyze the continuing trend in the judiciary to liberally construe
waters/wetlands legislation, but now with the CWA rather than the
11
RHA as the basis for these decisions.
Finally, this Article will
discuss and critique the two recent “less pioneering” Supreme
Court decisions in light of all this progressive history and
12
precedent, with particular attention paid to the Rapanos decision.
II. WETLANDS
A.

Nationally
Since early in our nation’s history, the American pioneer spirit
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B–C.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B–C.
See infra Parts V, VI.
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has driven our people to tame the wilderness and reclaim and
exploit our natural resources to their fullest extent. Such activities
include logging and deforestation, river diversion and damming,
mining and excavation, and wetlands reclamation in order to
provide fertile lands for farming and solid ground for construction
and development. With respect to wetlands, nearly fifty percent of
13
their former acreage has been lost to human activity.
1.

Old Views

Until the last few decades, many believed that wetlands served
no useful purpose, and that the public interest was best served by
draining and filling these lands. In fact, the common mindset in
the nineteenth century was that wetlands were “bogs of treachery,
mires of despair, homes of pests, and refuges for outlaw and
14
rebel.” Congress also seems, at one point, to have shared this
belief, indicated by the passage of the Swamp Lands Acts in the
mid-nineteenth century, which granted nearly sixty-five million
acres of federal lands to the states for the purposes of reclamation
in order to prevent the spread of insect-borne disease and to
15
promote the expansion of agriculture.
2.

Modern Views

But as science and society progressed, the “noxious and
useless” reputation of wetlands began to be called into question—
initially by backwoods hunters and gatherers who recognized that
sharply declining populations of duck and geese depended on this
16
type of habitat for their survival. In the fifty years between 1934
and 1984, over 3.5 million acres of wetlands were preserved
through the Duck Stamp Act—a federal initiative designed to
create a source of revenue from waterfowl hunters and other
17
outdoor enthusiasts. During those same years, Americans began
to recognize the value of environmental causes in general,
including wetlands, as indicated by the reservation and withdrawal
18
of millions of federal acres for national parks and monuments. As
13. David C. Forsberg, The Minnesota Wetland Conservation Act of 1991:
Balancing Public and Private Interests, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1992).
14. Id. at 1025.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1026.
17. Id.
18. See AmericanFrontiers.net, Public Lands Timeline, http://www.american
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knowledge of wetlands increased, their impressive water
purification and flood-control qualities came to be recognized. In
fact, wetlands are often described as the “kidneys of the landscape”
19
for their ability to clean polluted waters that pass through them.
[Wetlands] contribute directly to the water quality of lakes
and streams by acting as buffers, filtering the water which
ultimately passes into them . . . . Wetlands also retain
rainwater and snowmelt, permitting them to percolate
into underground aquifers. In the absence of [wetlands],
the water would rapidly find its way into streams and rivers
and ultimately to the sea, where its availability to human
communities is lost. Because of their ability to retain
water, wetlands are indispensable to effective flood
control. Flood damage is extremely costly, and wetland
retention and restoration are cost-effective methods of
20
reducing the damage.
In recognition of their many values, wetlands gained protection
under a host of state and federal laws.
3.

The 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act

The first of these laws was the 1948 Federal Water Pollution
21
But this law and its subsequent
Control Act (FWPCA).
amendments in the 1950s and 1960s were largely ineffective
because they only set forth a general plan for pollution control,
entrusting the states to implement and police the plan at their
22
discretion.
And the states, more interested in their own
economies and less interested in pollution at a national level,
largely disregarded the FWPCA because its advisory nature lacked
23
incentive for them to act.
As a result, many lakes, rivers, and wetlands were polluted well
frontiers.net/timeline (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (providing a timeline from
1492–1976).
19. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1027.
20. Id. at 1027–28. Wetlands also support a large variety of endangered
species; some thirty-five percent of them depend on wetlands for their survival. Id.
at 1028 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4401 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
21. Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
22. JOEL M. GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER ACT 5–6 (2005). The 1948
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, due to federalism concerns, allowed the
states to take the primary role in regulation and enforcement. See ROBIN KUNDIS
CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE
PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 12 (2004). See also Federal
Water Pollution Control Act § 1, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
23. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 5–6.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss3/2

6

Fortin: Comment: Rapanos v. United States—A Historical Perspective on the
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC

2007]

4/10/2007 1:07:02 PM

RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES

1231

beyond levels safe for human consumption or recreation—a fact
exemplified by two infamous events in 1969: sparks from a passing
train set the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, on fire for over
24
thirty minutes, and a Union Oil Company drilling platform
located six miles of the coast of Santa Barbara, California suffered a
blowout resulting in the release of 200,000 gallons of crude oil into
25
the Pacific Ocean. These circumstances and events, combined
with a new “environmental consciousness”—symbolized by the first
Earth Day in 1970—finally prompted Congress to act in a
comprehensive manner and on a national level to protect our
26
aqueous resources.
4.

The Clean Water Act

The 1972 amendment to the FWPCA, commonly known as the
27
Clean Water Act, is now the primary federal statute that regulates
pollution and other discharges into the waters of the United
28
States. The goal of the CWA is to “protect the quality of lakes,
streams, and other waters for recreational use, for maintenance of
29
aquatic life,” and to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
30
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” But as a federal
statute, the CWA cannot reach all waters and wetlands; the states
still have a large, although somewhat circumscribed, role to play in
the preservation and regulation of wetlands. In fact, the CWA
specifically states that “[i]t is the policy of Congress to recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan
31
the development . . . of land and water resources.”
24. Id. at 6–7; OhioHistoryCentral.org, Cuyahoga River Fire, http://www.ohio
historycentral.org/entry.php?rec=1642 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007).
25. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6; Santa Barbara Wildlife Care Network
Online, Santa Barbara’s 1969 Oil Spill, http://www.sbwcn.org/spill.shtml (last
visited Feb. 7, 2007).
26. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6.
27. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). The Clean
Water Act was amended in 1977 and in 1987; the current version is codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
28. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Clean Water Act § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
31. Id. § 101(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). The importance of this section is hotly
debated. Those who would seek to limit the Corps’s jurisdiction—the plurality
opinion in Rapanos, for example—often point to this section for support. See
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2223–24 (2006). Others assert that this
section is merely Congress’s recognition that the Commerce Clause cannot cover
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B. In Minnesota
Minnesota has the fourth-largest wetland area in the United
States, surpassed only by Alaska, Florida, and Louisiana, and it has
consistently been in the forefront of wetlands regulation and
32
preservation.
There are 9.285 million acres of recognized
33
wetlands in the state of Minnesota. But over fifty-two percent of
the state’s original wetlands have been lost due to development,
34
making way for houses, roads, and farmland.
The remaining
wetlands include “prairie potholes,” which are primarily freshwater
35
marshes formed by glaciers during the Pleistocene epoch. Prairie
potholes are some of the most important wetlands in the world
because three-quarters of all North American waterfowl originate
36
from these regions.
In 1991, the Minnesota Legislature acted to pass a new
comprehensive wetlands bill, entitled the Minnesota Wetland
37
Conservation Act (WCA). The WCA:
prohibits the draining and filling of protected wetlands
unless replaced by restored or created wetlands of equal
public value under an approved replacement plan. It
designates as “scientific and natural areas” about 150,000
acres of specifically described peatlands in northern
Minnesota. The [WCA] restricts a variety of activities in
peatlands including construction of new drainage systems,
exploration for and removal of peat, oil, gas, and other
38
minerals and commercial logging.
With the passage of the WCA, Minnesota adopted a “no net loss”
39
policy in regard to its wetlands. Judicial decisions over the past
all waters, and that certain waters still need to be regulated solely by the states. See
id. at 2246 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1023.
33. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Online, Wetlands, http://
www.dnr.state.mn.us/wetlands/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
34. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources Online, Wetlands: Benefits
of Wetlands, http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/wetlands/benefits.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2007).
35. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1023. In the United States, prairie potholes
are found in North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, and Minnesota; in Canada,
prairie potholes are found in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Id.
36. Id.
37. 1991 Minn. Laws 2794, ch. 354 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of MINN. STAT. chs. 84 and 103A (2006)).
38. Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1022–23. Peatlands are another common type
of wetlands.
39. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: WETLANDS REGULATION
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40

thirty years accord with this policy.
But a frequently cited flaw in the WCA is the fact that its
jurisdiction does not apply to artificial wetlands, only naturally
41
occurring ones. This flaw exists due to pre-WCA case law that
42
interprets wetlands as including only “natural” waters. It is in this
natural/artificial wetlands jurisdictional distinction that Minnesota
43
state law differs from federal law (i.e. the CWA), and it is one of
the main reasons why an understanding of federal law is critically
important to practitioners in Minnesota who are working in the
various areas of land regulation. Furthermore, even where
Minnesota state regulations are applicable, the CWA also requires a
parallel permitting process for any development or filling of
44
wetlands that are also federal waters of the United States.
Therefore, in order to develop a full picture of federal
wetlands regulation, this Article begins with a discussion of
jurisdictional issues as they relate to waters and water pollution
generally, starting with the departure from English precedent in
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Although antiquated and
largely superseded by statute and subsequent case law, these early
IN MINNESOTA 11 (2003), http://www.bwsr.state.mn.us/wetlands/publications/
MNRegulations.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Christopher J. Schulte, Minnesota
Wetland Conservation Act of 1991: “Did Minnesota Miss the Boat to Protect Artificially
Created Wetlands?”, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 439, 439 (1992).
40. See, e.g., In re Christenson, 417 N.W.2d 607 (Minn. 1987) (restricting
permit applicant from enlarging and rebuilding pre-existing wetland drainage
system); County of Freeborn by Teveson v. Byrson, 309 Minn. 178, 243 N.W.2d 316
(1976) (enjoining construction of highway where alternate route around wetland
was available); In re Cent. Baptist Theological Seminary, 370 N.W.2d 642 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (building of radio tower in wetland in detriment to wildlife habitat
not permitted); State v. Drum, No. CX-92-922, 1998 WL 170118 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 14, 1998) (upholding conviction for violation of WCA cease-and-desist
order).
41. See Schulte, supra note 39, at 439 (recommending amendments to the
statute). See also Forsberg, supra note 13, at 1052–57 (containing a further critique
of the WCA).
42. See Dep’t. of Natural Res. v. Mahnomen County Hearings Unit, 407
N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (distinguishing between artificially and
naturally created wetlands); Dep’t. of Natural Res. v. Todd County Hearings Unit,
356 N.W.2d 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting the designation of three sites in
central Minnesota as wetlands because they were artificially created and enlarged).
See also Schulte, supra note 39, at 459–60 (“[These] holdings are unequivocal that
wetlands artificially created receive no protection under the public waters statutes.
The state, therefore, can claim no jurisdiction . . . .”).
43. The CWA does not make this distinction. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
Therefore, even if a Minnesota wetland is not subject to state regulation, it may
still be subject to federal regulation.
44. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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decisions shed light on how liberal judicial decision making formed
the basis for the expansion of legislation and regulation pertaining
to wetlands; in other words, they are the beginning in a long line of
cases that suggest Rapanos and SWANCC were wrongly decided.
III. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER WATERS AND
WETLANDS
While the CWA represents the federal government’s most
45
marked policy shift in water pollution and wetlands regulation, it
is certainly not our nation’s first effort to control what is put into
our waters. Since 1871, Congress and the federal courts have been
steadily expanding the body of law concerning what type of waters
46
and wetlands are subject to regulation.
Before this expansion
occurred, American courts had followed English common law,
which held that a country’s waters were only those that were subject
47
to the ebb and flow of the tide. In the United States, this rule
largely limited federal jurisdiction to coastal waters and the Great
Lakes. At that time in history, though, water pollution was only
starting to become a problem. Accordingly, early decisions dealing
with jurisdictional issues are largely based on commerce in the
traditional sense of the word, as seen in the following case.
A. The Term “Waters of the United States” Gains New Meaning
In The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court made a definite shift
away from English common law and towards a more expanded
interpretation of what constitutes “navigable waters of the United
48
States.” The Daniel Ball was a cargo steamer that carried goods
45. “The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
represented a change in the regulatory philosophy from [inconsistent and often
non-existent] water-quality standards established by states to a [national] ‘clean
waters’ approach.” GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6–7. For example, a specific
federal-level objective of the CWA was the elimination of all pollutant discharges
by 1985. Id. at 7. This obviously did not happen, but it represents the spirit of the
legislation, which the Supreme Court in recent years seems to have forgotten. See
discussion infra Part V.
46. This expansion closely parallels the Supreme Court’s increasing
willingness to grant Congress regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. See
generally E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981).
47. See, e.g., Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 980, 981 (K.B.)
(“For wherever a [water] flows and reflows it is in the nature of a highway, and is
common to all.”).
48. 77 U.S. 557, 563 (10 Wall. 1870).
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up and down the Grand River, which was navigable wholly within
49
A federal
the state of Michigan for approximately forty miles.
statute passed in 1838 required a permit for any ships carrying
50
cargo or passengers in any navigable waters of the United States.
The Court, holding that a permit was required for transit along the
Grand River, extended the regulatory power of the government to
include waters that “form in their ordinary condition by
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or
51
foreign countries.”
In other words, the Court held that when
purely intrastate transit of goods has the potential to affect
interstate commerce through continuous transit connections,
52
federal regulation is proper under the Commerce Clause.
B. The Rivers and Harbors Act
With this new jurisdictional power, courtesy of the Supreme
Court, Congress was able to pass a law that limited discharges into
these new federally controlled waters. In 1899, Congress passed the
Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), which was primarily designed to
aide navigation by preventing obstructions from being discharged
53
into waterways. And for the first few decades following its passage,
54
that is exactly for what the RHA was used. But with the industrial
revolution and the increase in factories situated along rivers and
lakes, water pollution was quickly becoming more prevalent. It was
during this time when the judiciary made its first pioneering step
49. Id. at 564.
50. Id.; see also 5 Stat. 304 (1838).
51. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
52. This holding was important when the Corps (many decades later) first
sought to regulate intrastate tributaries of navigable interstate rivers by reason of
their “continuous connections.” See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.b (regulation of
wetlands adjacent to tributaries).
53. Rivers & Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 407 (2000)):
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter
of any kind or description whatever . . . [but] the Secretary of the
Army . . . may permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in
navigable waters, within limits to be defined and under conditions to be
prescribed by him . . . .
Id. Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act is commonly known as the Refuse
Act.
54. See, e.g., Corrigan Transit Co. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 137 F. 851 (7th
Cir. 1905) (shipping line affected by the alteration of the current in a canal, due
to structural changes made by the Sanitary District).
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forward. Although nowhere in the language of the RHA did
Congress provide authority to control water pollution, a series of
judicial decisions from the 1930s to the 1960s interpreted the RHA
as impliedly supplying this power. In essence, congressional intent
took a back seat to an increasing concern for the quality of our
55
nation’s water resources, with the federal judiciary at the wheel.
C. Stretching the Rivers and Harbors Act to Its Breaking Point
Consequently, until the passage of the CWA, the United States
prosecuted an increasing number of RHA violations that had
56
The judicially powered
nothing to do with navigation per se.
expansion of the RHA’s use reached its peak when the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed, in two famous cases, what had become a
57
sizeable body of law in the lower courts. The Court interpreted
the RHA not just as a navigational aide, but also as a tool to combat
industrial pollution.
1.

United States v. Republic Steel Corp.

The first case, United States v. Republic Steel Corp., involved iron
58
mills on the Calumet River near Gary, Indiana. It was undisputed
in the case that the only discharge from the mills was in the liquid
state, but the Court took an expansive reading of section 10 of the
RHA, dismissing the argument that the word “‘obstruction’ means
59
some kind of structure.” “We read the [RHA] charitably in light
55. The early cases under the Refuse Act are regarded as the first attempts to
use federal statutes to control water pollution. See CRAIG, supra note 22, at 10;
GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 5.
56. CRAIG, supra note 22, at 10. Even as early as 1936, in the case La Merced,
which involved an oil spill on Lake Washington near Seattle, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals liberally interpreted the RHA and saw “no reason for limiting
‘refuse matter of any kind or description whatever’ to such refuse matter only as
would impede or obstruct navigation. The plain intention of Congress was to
prohibit the discharge into navigable water of any material . . . .” La Merced, 84
F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1936).
57. See infra Part III.C.1–2.
58. 362 U.S. 482, 483 (1960). The mills acquired water intake from the river,
used it in the manufacturing process, filtered it, and then discharged it back into
the river. Id. But minute suspended industrial solids, mostly iron, remained in the
effluent. Id. The only “obstruction” created by this process was the gradual
shallowing of the river, at a rate of approximately one foot per decade. See id.
483–84.
59. Id. at 486. Section 10 of the RHA is very similar to section 13: “the
creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is hereby
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of the purpose to be served. The philosophy of the statement of
Mr. Justice Holmes . . . that ‘[a] river is more than an amenity, it is
a treasure,’ forbids a narrow, cramped reading either of [Section]
60
13 or of [Section] 10.”
Furthermore, the Court held that
deference should be given to the judgment of the administrative
agency in charge of maintaining navigable river ways—the Army
Corps of Engineers—to determine what acts constitute a violation
61
of the RHA.
2.

United States v. Standard Oil Co.

Six years after deciding Republic Steel, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its commitment to using a liberal construction of the
62
RHA to abate pollution. United States v. Standard Oil Co. involved
the accidental discharge of aviation fuel into the St. Johns River in
63
central Florida.
The United States brought a suit against
Standard Oil under section 13 of the RHA, claiming that the
64
100-octane fuel was “refuse matter.” Clearly, an environmental,
rather than navigational motive was behind the prosecution.
Justice Douglas even went so far in his opinion as to admit that the
case was not of the type of violation that Congress had originally
intended to prevent, yet, following the “spirit” of the precedent in
previous decades, he ruled in favor of the government nevertheless,
stating:
prohibited . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000). When read in relation to section 13, the
original intent of Congress that this statute be primarily a navigation aide is
revealed.
60. Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 491 (quoting Holmes, J., in New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931)). New Jersey v. New York involved an attempt by New
York to divert a significant portion of the Delaware River. 283 U.S. 336, 341
(1931).
61. The case record reveals the Corps’s extensive involvement in policing the
Calumet since 1909. See Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 491 n.5. The Court, recognizing
that the Corps, as the administrative agency in charge of enforcing the RHA,
having much more experience dealing with and interpreting the statute, stated
that “[a]ny doubts are resolved by a consistent administrative construction which
refused to give immunity to industrial wastes resulting in the deposit of solids. . . .
This long-standing administrative construction, while not conclusive of course, is
entitled to ‘great weight . . . .’” Id. at 490, 491 n.5. This prescient statement
foreshadowed the Court’s opinion in another famous administrative law case. See
discussion infra note 112. It is also a concept that has become largely lost in the
recent SWANCC and Rapanos cases. See discussion infra Part V.
62. CRAIG, supra note 22, at 11.
63. 384 U.S. 224, 225 (1966). A dock-side shut-off valve had been negligently
left open, causing the spill. Id.
64. Id.
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This case comes to us at a time in the Nation’s history
when there is greater concern than ever over pollution—
one of the main threats to our free-flowing rivers and to
our lakes as well. The crisis that we face in this respect
would not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing
offenses where Congress has not acted nor in stretching
statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange
conditions. But whatever may be said of the rule of strict
construction, it cannot provide a substitute for common
sense, precedent, and legislative history. We cannot
65
construe § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act in a vacuum.
3.

Moving Forward

In light of these decisions, legal scholars and commentators
found it curious that a nineteenth century statute was still being
66
used to remedy water pollution issues, even after all of the
67
amendments to the FWPCA. In fact, after the broad, reaching
decisions in Standard Oil and Republic Steel, there was still much
uncertainty as to the future enforcement of water pollution; in
68
other words, could the judiciary stretch the RHA even further?
But any uncertainty was put to rest in 1972 with the passage of the
CWA.
IV. REGULATION OF WETLANDS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Better late than never, it took Congress another six years after
the decision in Standard Oil was announced before it passed the

65. Id. at 225–26. “[B]y the mid-1960s, the United States had firmly
established its authority under the RHA ability to prevent pollution in the
navigable waters.” CRAIG, supra note 22, at 11.
66. See, e.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr., Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse
Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 762 (1971) (noting
“[t]hat the solons of the nineteenth century appear to have surpassed their
modern successors in fashioning useful tools for combating water pollution is a
curious commentary on the accidents of legal history and on the vitality of the
current drive to secure water quality”).
67. Before Congress passed the CWA, the FWPCA had been amended in
1952, 1956, 1961, 1965, 1966, and 1970. See CRAIG, supra note 22, at 13–22
(discussing in detail the various amendments).
68. Professor Rodgers discusses two hypothetical situations, the first involving
aggressive prosecution of virtually all major contributors of industrial waste to
navigable waters, and the second involving “[u]nprepared, uninspired, and
disinterested [officials who perceive] the certification [or permit] as but another
piece of paper to sign.” See Rodgers, supra note 66, at 821.
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69

CWA. With all of the strained applications of the RHA, it was a
badly needed addition to federal law. Serving a complex problem,
the CWA is a complex piece of legislation, containing hundreds of
provisions, regulations, and definitions—a full treatment of its text
70
is beyond the scope of this Article.
A. Statutory Language
1.

The Corps’s Power

The CWA gives regulatory power to the Corps through a
discretionary permitting process set forth in section 404. When the
Corps has jurisdiction over a particular area, “the discharge of any
pollutant by any person [is] unlawful” without a section 404
71
But the Corps “may issue [section 404] permits, after
permit.
notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
72
disposal sites.” This permitting process can be very long, involved,
and expensive. As Justice Scalia commented:
In deciding whether to grant or deny a [section 404]
permit, the [Corps] exercises the discretion of an
enlightened despot, relying on such factors as
“economics,” “aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general,
the needs and welfare of the people.” The average
applicant for an individual permit spends 788 days and
$271,596 in completing the process, and the average
69. Under the FWPCA, only one case was prosecuted in the twenty-four years
between 1948 and 1972. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 6. The FWPCA was
initially designed to be implemented by the states, with only limited federal
support in financing and research. See id. at 5–6. Although the FWPCA was
amended several times before 1972, no adequate federal enforcement was ever
included, and it remained basically toothless. See id. at 6. Thus, the CWA is
generally considered to be the first legislative effort to specifically combat water
pollution, lightening the burden on the court system from strained applications of
the RHA. See id. at 5–6.
70. This Article has heretofore discussed water pollution generally in an
effort to show the overall relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.
But after Congress passed the CWA, wetlands, rivers, lakes, and other areas all
furcated into their own respective branches of law. Because the Corps has
jurisdiction over the filling of wetlands with dredged or fill material, and because
only wetlands are involved in the Rapanos decision and the sequence of decisions
that led up to it, this Article will, from this point forward, focus its discussion on
the Corps’s permitting process that is required to dredge or fill wetlands.
71. Clean Water Act, tit. III, § 301(a), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000)).
72. Id. § 404(a) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000)).
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applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and
$28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design
changes. “[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the
private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.”
73
These costs cannot be avoided . . . .
Often times, in processing a permit application, the Corps requires
that the applicant engage in wetland restoration projects so that
74
the potential impact on wetlands is minimized.
2.

”Navigable Waters”

Just as with the RHA, the primary issue in Supreme Court cases
addressing wetlands regulation under the CWA was the meaning of
“navigable waters,” a term which Congress has defined as “the
75
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” After
passage of the CWA, the Corps initially adopted the traditional
76
definition for the term navigable waters.
But it soon became
evident that this definition was clearly insufficient in light of the
77
stated purpose of the CWA.
Recognizing this problem, the Natural Resources Defense
Council brought suit against the Corps in Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Callaway, arguing that the legislative history,
historical circumstances, and judicial precedent under which the
CWA was enacted mandated a broad interpretation of navigable
waters, hence broad regulatory power over, among other things,

73. Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214–15 (2006) (quoting 33
C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (2004) and David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of
Environmental Regulation by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland
Permitting Process, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 74–76, 81 (2002)) (citations omitted).
74. See EPA Wetland Regulatory Authority, Regulatory Requirements, http://
www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/reg_authority_pr.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2007) (describing the general principles that the Corps follows when issuing
section 404 permits); see also EPA: River Corridor and Wetland Restoration,
Principles for the Ecological Restoration of Aquatic Resources, http://www.epa.
gov/owow/wetlands/restore/principles.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
75. Clean Water Act § 502(7) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)).
76. This definition is traditional in the Daniel Ball sense of the word—waters
that are navigable in fact or readily susceptible to being rendered so. See 39 Fed.
Reg. 12115, 12119 (Apr. 3, 1974). The text of the Corps’s initial definition stated:
“Navigable waters of the United States are those waters which are presently or have
been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of
interstate or foreign commerce.” 37 Fed. Reg. 18290 (Sept. 9, 1972).
77. The goal of the CWA is to “protect the quality of lakes, streams, and other
waters for recreational use, for maintenance of aquatic life.” GROSS & DODGE,
supra note 22, at 1.
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78

wetlands. On motion for summary judgment, the district court
held that “Congress, by defining the term ‘navigable waters’ . . . to
mean ‘the waters of the United States,’ . . . asserted federal
jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent
79
permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”
Furthermore, it held that the Corps was without power to amend or
change the statutory definition through its own regulations, in
80
derogation of its responsibilities under the CWA.
The court
ordered the Corps to rescind its current regulations, and write and
publish new regulations within thirty days that “clearly recogniz[e]
81
the full regulatory mandate of the [CWA].”
The result of the Callaway decision was a revised set of
regulations in 1975 and 1977 that dramatically increased the
jurisdiction of the Corps in regard to “navigable waters.” These
revised regulations extended the definition of “the waters of the
United States” to the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power as
82
it was then understood.
78. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686
(D. D.C. 1975) (the defendants were Chief of the Army Corps of Engineers, Lt.
Gen. William C. Gribble, and Secretary of the Army, Howard H. Callaway).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Corps chose to accept this ruling and it did not appeal the order.
82. Immediately after the Callaway ruling, the Corps took the direction of the
judge seriously and amended their regulations drastically—“navigable waters”
would now include:
[a]ll artificially created channels and canals used for recreational or
other navigational purposes that are connected to other navigable waters,
. . . [a]ll tributaries of navigable waters of the United States up to their
headwaters and landward to their ordinary high water mark, . . . [and]
[f]reshwater wetlands including marshes, shallows, swamps and, similar
areas that are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters and that
support freshwater vegetation.
40 Fed. Reg. 31320 (July 25, 1975). Two years later, the definition of navigable
waters was further extended to include: “[a]ll other waters of the United States . . .
such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and
other waters that are not part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to
navigable waters of the United States, the degradation or destruction of which
could affect interstate commerce.” 42 Fed. Reg. 37144 (July 19, 1977). With
respect to these new regulations, Justice Scalia later commented, in a criticizing
tone, that
immense expansion of federal regulation of land use . . . has occurred
under the [CWA]. . . . In the last three decades, the Corps and the
[EPA] have interpreted their jurisdiction over “the waters of the United
States” to cover 270-to-300 million acres of swampy lands in the United
States—including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the
lower 48 States.
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3. Congressional Acquiescence to the New Definition of Navigable
Waters
In 1977, critics of the CWA who felt that the Corps had too
much jurisdiction, especially after the 1977 regulations were
adopted, attempted to insert limitations in the CWA amendments
83
of that year.
Debate on the proposal centered largely around
wetlands preservation: those who supported the plan argued that
the Corps’s new regulations far exceeded what Congress had
intended in 1972, while opponents of the plan argued that a
narrower definition of navigable waters would exclude vast
84
stretches of crucial wetlands to the detriment of the environment.
The House of Representatives passed the amendment, while the
Senate rejected it; the Conference Committee eventually adopted
the Senate approach, and efforts to narrow the definition of
85
navigable waters were abandoned.
Perhaps this outcome was luck, or perhaps a majority of
Congress decided to take a cue from what the judiciary had been
doing over the past fifty years and used their power with the
purpose of bettering the environment in mind. The Conference
Report represented the sentiment of those environmentally
conscious members of Congress who pushed to defeat the
amendment:
There is no question that the systematic destruction of the
Nation’s wetlands is causing serious, permanent ecological
damage. The wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are
the Nation’s most biologically active areas.
They
represent a principal source of food supply . . . . The
unregulated destruction of these areas is a matter which
needs to be corrected and which implementation of
86
section 404 has attempted to achieve.
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2212, 2215 (2006).
83. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985)
(discussing the congressional record).
84. Id. It is important to note that wetlands were not specifically enumerated
in the text of the CWA. But the Corps interpreted its new mandate to include
wetlands as well, much like they had interpreted the RHA broadly before 1972.
GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 77. Cases discussing the applicability of the
CWA to wetlands include Parkview Corp. v. Dep’t. of Army Corps of Eng’rs, 469
F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Wis. 1979), and Track 12, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 618
F. Supp. 448 (D. Minn. 1985).
85. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 136–37.
86. S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 10 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4336.
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B. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
It appeared that in the first few years after the CWA was in
force, the liberal philosophy and pioneering tradition of
construing environmental regulations to the broadest extent
possible was continued by the Congress, the Corps, and by the
lower federal courts. The Supreme Court finally spoke in 1985,
issuing its first wetlands opinion on the validity of the Corps’s
87
policy that wetlands connected to “waters of the United States”
88
also came under the purview of section 404 of the CWA.
1.

Factual Background

The defendant in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
was a housing developer that owned approximately eighty acres of
undeveloped marshland north of Detroit in Harrison Township,
89
Macomb County, Michigan. The land in question was located one
mile west of Lake Saint Clair and parallel to the Clinton River, both
90
traditional navigable waters. Around seventy-five percent of the
land was used as farmland before it was purchased by the
91
defendant. Due to emergency measures taken by the Township
during a period of heavy flooding in 1973, the drainage on
92
portions of the land was destroyed. Several years later, Riverside
93
Bayview contracted to have the land filled. It submitted a partially
94
In
completed permit to the Corps in November of 1976.
December, Riverside Bayview began to place fill material on the
87. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2004):
The term “waters of the United States” means (1) All waters which are
currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in
interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide; (2) All interstate waters including interstate
wetlands; (3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams . . .
the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or
foreign commerce . . . .
Id.
88. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 121, 139.
89. Id. at 124 (summarizing the facts); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir. 1984) (providing a more detailed
description of the facts).
90. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124; Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 392.
91. Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 392.
92. Id. at 393. The court does not place any significance on the fact that the
wetland conditions on the Riverside Bayview land were exacerbated by municipal
actions in response to flooding problems.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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property in preparation for construction of a housing
development, and the Corps ordered it to cease and desist its
95
activities.
When Riverside Bayview continued nonetheless,
96
litigation ensued.
2.

Opinion per Justice White

The Court’s opinion was an unqualified affirmance of the
tradition and precedent of liberally interpreting waters/wetlands
legislation. First, the Court addressed the intent of Congress in
passing the CWA by recognizing that:
[o]n a purely linguistic level, it may appear unreasonable
to classify “lands,” wet or otherwise, as “waters.” Such a
simplistic response, however, does justice neither to the
problem faced by the Corps in defining the scope of its
authority under § 404(a) nor to the realities of the
problem of water pollution that the Clean Water Act was
97
intended to combat.
Next, after analyzing the congressional record, the Court held
that Congress had intended to “exercise its powers under the
Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not
be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that
98
term.” The Court also noted that, from the record, it appeared
that “the scope of the Corps’s asserted jurisdiction over wetlands
was specifically brought to Congress’s attention, and Congress
rejected measures designed to curb the Corps’s jurisdiction in large
part because of its concern that protection of wetlands would be
99
unduly hampered by a narrow definition of ‘navigable waters.’”
Given this breadth granted by Congress, it was therefore
“reasonable for the Corps to interpret the term ‘waters’ to
encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally

95. Id.
96. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124–25; Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 393.
The district court enjoined Riverside from further filling without the Corps’s
permission. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124; Riverside Bayview, 729 F.2d at 393.
97. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132. The Court also asserted that
“[p]rotection of aquatic ecosystems . . . demand[s] broad federal authority to
control pollution, for water moves in hydrologic cycles and it is essential that
discharge of pollutants be controlled at the source.” Id. at 132–33 (quoting S.
Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3742).
98. Id. at 133.
99. Id. at 137. See also discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
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100

defined.”
On this point, the Court chose to quote from the
EPA’s regulations on wetlands—the language speaks volumes as to
the Court’s intent when framing this opinion:
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution
cannot rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all
waters that together form the entire aquatic system.
Water moves in hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of
this part of the aquatic system . . . will affect the water
quality of the other waters within that aquatic system.
For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction
under section 404 must include any adjacent wetlands that
form the border of or are in reasonable proximity to
other waters of the United States, as these wetlands are
101
part of this aquatic system.
Concluding the opinion, the Court held that the Corps had acted
reasonably in requiring Riverside Bayview to seek a permit before
102
filling its land.
C. The Judiciary Further Stretches the CWA post-Riverside Bayview
With the broad language in Riverside Bayview concerning the
103
extent of the Corps’s authority under section 404, it is no surprise
that numerous cases were entertained before various federal circuit
courts of appeals in the years that followed. Of these cases, two
stand out as particularly pioneering in the field of wetland
regulation. These two cases tested whether the judiciary would
continue its trend of broadly interpreting Congress’s intent when it
104
delegated authority to the Corps under the CWA.

100. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133.
101. Id. at 133–34 (quoting 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,128 (July 19, 1977)).
102. Id. at 139. The Court took every opportunity to show that it was
implementing Congress’s plan, not its own. “[W]etlands are a concern of the
Clean Water Act and [when] . . . defining the waters covered by the Act to include
wetlands, the Corps is ‘implementing congressional policy rather than embarking
on a frolic of its own.’” Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
375 (1969)).
103. Noting that it was not called upon to address the extent of the Corps’s
authority to regulate wetlands, the Court seemingly invited litigants to test this
authority. See 474 U.S. at 131 n.8. And so they did.
104. See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1993); Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
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United States v. Pozsgai
a.

Factual Background
105

In United States v. Pozsgai, defendant Pozsgai began to fill
concrete rubble, earth, and building scraps on his fourteen-acre lot
in Pennsylvania in order to build on the property a garage that was
106
needed to expand his truck repair business.
Pozsgai had been
warned by three separate engineers that the land would probably
fall under the Corps’s definition of wetlands and had been advised
107
to seek a permit.
Pozsgai ignored not only the warnings of his
engineers, but also several cease-and-desist letters that the Corps
108
sent to him. Pozsgai continued to fill his land.
The Corps filed suit against Pozsgai, and the district court
109
granted a permanent injunction. There had been several surveys
done on the wetlands in question—the Corps’s biologist and field
investigator described the land “as ‘a forested wetland dominated
by arrowwood’ and noted ‘areas of standing water were scattered
throughout the site,’ and ‘a stream flows along the east border of
the property and wetland and is a tributary to the Pennsylvania
Canal,’” which the district court found to be a navigable water of
110
the United States.
b. Extending Regulation to Tributaries and Their Adjacent
Wetlands
Pozsgai presented the court of appeals with a chance to weigh
in on how far it felt that the Commerce Clause allowed the Corps
to exercise wetland jurisdiction. First, the Third Circuit recognized
the holding in Riverside Bayview by reaffirming that
[i]n determining the limits of its power to regulate
discharges under the [CWA], the Corps must necessarily
105. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 719.
106. Id. at 721–22.
107. Id. at 722. In this case, the wetland in question was not adjacent to a
navigable water of the United States like in Riverside Bayview—it was one step
removed and adjacent to a tributary of a water of the United States. See id. at 722
n.1 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3), (7) (1992) for the proposition that “[t]he
regulations . . . cover wetlands adjacent to tributaries of waters used in interstate
commerce”).
108. Id. at 722–23.
109. Id. at 724. Pozsgai was also found guilty on related criminal charges. Id.
at 723.
110. Id. at 721–22, 730.
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choose some point at which water ends and land begins.
Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy
task: the transition from water to solid ground is not
necessarily or typically an abrupt one . . . . Where on this
continuum to find the limit of “waters” is far from
111
obvious.
Second, the court of appeals recognized that courts should
grant deference to agency interpretations, especially when the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, like the CWA, which
addresses a scientifically complicated subject and has an intricate
112
Third, the court turned to Pozsgai’s claim
regulatory structure.
that “the Corps’s adjacent wetlands regulations as applied to them
113
violates the Commerce Clause.”
But it dismissed Pozsgai’s
argument by differentiating statutes that do require an
individualized effect on interstate commerce from statutes that do
114
not, such as the CWA. The court found that the CWA statutorily
delegates authority to the Corps, which has determined that
wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries of waters used in interstate
115
commerce should be regulated at the federal level.
Rather than
individualizing the effects that Pozsgai’s actions had on the
environment, the court treated his infraction as one in a class of
116
activities, and the class as a whole generally requires permitting.
Finally, the court held that because the Corps’s “regulations reveal
[that it] gave serious consideration to this issue, . . . [w]e cannot say
111. Id. at 728 (discussing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S.
121, 132 (1985)).
112. Id. at 729. Agency deference is known as Chevron deference, after Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron
involved an application of the Clean Air Act, and it was the first major case in
administrative law to specifically grant executive agencies a large amount of
autonomy to interpret congressional laws. It also introduced the concept of
judicial restraint into this field of law: “Judges are not experts in the field, and are
not part of either political branch of the Government.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
113. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d at 733. “We will uphold application of the law if there is
a ‘rational basis’ for the congressional determination that the regulated activity
‘affects interstate commerce,’ and if the means chosen to regulate the activity are
reasonable.” Id. (following the reasoning in Chevron).
114. Id. at 733–34.
115. Id. at 733.
116. Id. at 734. The court here made a reference to what is known as the
“cumulative effect” doctrine in Commerce Clause jurisprudence: “[W]here the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of the federal
[commerce] power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual
instances’ of the class.” Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154
(1968)).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 2
15. FORTIN - RC.DOC

1248

4/10/2007 1:07:02 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3
117

the Corps did not have a rational basis for this determination.”
Therefore, the Third Circuit upheld the Corps’s regulation that
extended its jurisdiction to wetlands adjacent to tributaries of
waters of the United States against a Commerce Clause attack, and
in doing so continued the tradition of liberally interpreting water
and wetlands regulations.
2. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency
a.

Factual Background

The second pioneering case after Riverside Bayview was Hoffman
Homes, Inc. v. EPA, a case addressing the extent to which the Corps
118
Hoffman
could “stretch” in interpreting its own regulations.
Homes had begun to fill some of its land in the Village of Hoffman
119
Estates, Illinois, without a section 404 permit.
The land, a bowlshaped depression at the northeast border of the tract that covered
approximately one acre and contained at least four different kinds
of wetland vegetation, was not connected to any tributary or any
120
other water of the United States. The Corps sought enforcement
of the CWA against Hoffman because of its interpretation of a
regulation that defined waters of the United States; the regulation
provided for jurisdiction over “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate
lakes, rivers, [or] streams . . . the use, degradation or destruction of
121
which could affect interstate or foreign commerce.”
The Corps
117. Id. at 734 n.11 (discussing how previous statutes and regulations
culminated in the (then) current form of the Corps’s regulations concerning
wetlands). Although courts in the 1980s and 1990s continued the trend of
increasing the Corps’s power to regulate wetlands, unlike Republic Steel and
Standard Oil, these courts relied more on legislative history—which can be
ambiguous—than on environmental policy arguments. “The legislative history
also demonstrates the significance and breadth of the term ‘navigable waters.’
The Conference Report states: ‘[t]he conferees fully intend that the term
‘navigable
waters’
be
given
the
broadest
possible
constitutional
interpretation . . . .’” Id. at 726–27 (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972)
(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668). Unfortunately, this shift in
argument style may have eventually led to undesirable results. See discussion infra
Part V.
118. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
119. Id. at 257–58.
120. Id. at 258. The land lay over 750 feet away from Poplar Creek, a tributary
of a water of the United States. Id.
121. Id. at 260 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1992)). See also discussion
infra note 148 (setting out the text of the Migratory Bird Rule as addressed by the
Supreme Court in SWANCC).
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interpreted this regulation “as allowing migratory birds to be [the]
122
connection between a wetland and interstate commerce.”
b.

Extending Regulation to Migratory Bird Habitats

The Seventh Circuit first noted that the regulation does not
require an actual effect on interstate commerce, only a potential
123
It then went on to state the rule that “[a]n agency’s
effect.
construction of its own regulation binds a court in all but
extraordinary cases” and that it must uphold the Corps’s
interpretation “unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
124
the regulation.”
With this in mind, the court held that it was
reasonable to interpret the regulation as including wetlands where
the only interstate commerce connection was migratory bird
125
activity.
Therefore, as far as the Seventh Circuit was concerned,
the EPA and the Corps were free to interpret their own regulations
very broadly.
3.

Questioning the Rapid Expansion of Power
a.

Arguments Against Pozsgai and Hoffman

Although the decisions in Pozsgai and Hoffman represented the
126
majority sentiment in the federal circuits post-Riverside Bayview,
122. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261. In effect, the Corps sought to regulate
any water, no matter how far disconnected to any navigable water of the United
States, if birds, in the course of their yearly migration, used the water to alight.
123. Id. at 260. In support of the interstate commerce connection, the court
pointed to the fact that “[t]hroughout North America, millions of people annually
spend more than a billion dollars on hunting, trapping, and observing migratory
birds. Yet, the cumulative loss of wetlands has reduced populations of many bird
species and consequently the ability of people to hunt, trap, and observe those
birds.” Id. at 261.
124. Id. at 260.
125. Id. at 261. Despite this holding, the court ruled against the EPA because
it felt that the Corps had not proved that migratory birds did in fact visit the land
in question. “After April showers not every temporary wet spot necessarily
becomes subject to governmental control.” Id. at 262. This statement was
particularly telling. Although the court here was willing to uphold the “Migratory
Bird Rule” against an administrative challenge, the end result foreshadowed the
Supreme Court’s sentiments several years later when the rule was considered
before that Court. See discussion infra Part V.A.
126. A notable exception to the expansion of Corps’s power under section 404
was the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir.
1997). Following the recent Supreme Court holding in United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (school-zone gun-control law not allowable under the Commerce
Clause), Judge Niemeyer based the majority’s holding (2-1) on the Commerce
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legal commentators presented a mixed view of the Corps’s
jurisdiction. They were concerned that Congress did not have the
ability to regulate certain wetlands under the Commerce Clause,
and they were also concerned that the Corps did not have the
ability to interpret its mandate under the CWA as broadly as it had
been. After a thorough discussion of the term “navigable waters” as
used by Congress over the past century, two respected
127
commentators, James K. Jackson and William A. Nitze, concluded
that:
[L]egislative and judicial history concerning the term
‘navigable waters’ indicate that the term ‘navigable
waters,’ as used in [the CWA], was to include all waters
covered by the expanded judicial interpretation of that
128
term, but no others. There is no indication in the
language or history of the 1972 amendments that
Congress was asserting jurisdiction over ground water or
any other waters which were not in some way connected
129
with waterborne commerce.
The authors’ proposition on this point is certainly plausible,
considering the monumental change in regulation that Congress
had enacted under the CWA. It is important to recognize that
although Congress legislates as a whole, it is not comprised of a sole
voice. Although many judicial opinions speak of congressional
intent, often quoting various members of Congress in the majority
whose record statements reflect the court’s position, it is probable
that there would also be a significant number of members of
Congress who did not agree with that proposition. As the authors
Clause, stating that the Corps did not possess the power to regulate otherwise
isolated wetlands that were used as habitats for migratory birds. Wilson, 133 F.3d at
257.
127. James K. Jackson & William A. Nitze, Wetlands Protection Under Section 404
of the Clean Water Act—The Riverside Bayview Decision, Its Past and Future, 7 PUB. LAND
L. REV. 21, 26–34 (1986).
128. This language refers to a statement by representative Dingell while the
CWA was in the congressional conference committee:
[I]t is enough that the waterway serves as a link in the chain of commerce
among the states as it flows in the various channels of transportation. . . .
Thus, this new definition clearly encompasses all water bodies, including
mainstreams and their tributaries, for water quality purposes. No longer
are the old, narrow definitions of navigability . . . going to govern matters
covered by this bill.
Id. at 33.
129. Id. Attempting to divine the elusive concept, they comment: “Clearly, a
wholesale expansion of federal control over other waters was not then intended by
Congress.” Id. at 34.
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point out, the definition of “navigable waters” after 1972 surely was
meant to include more than the holding in decades-old opinions
130
such as The Daniel Ball, but they do call into question the holdings
131
in Pozsgai and Hoffman.
The authors also address the statement in Riverside Bayview
concerning the acquiescence of Congress to the 1977 Corps’s
interpretation of its mandate under section 404. They argue that
the legislative history of the 1977 amendment, although not
concerning section 404, indicates that Congress tacitly accepted the
Corps’s expanded interpretation of its mandate in 1975 following
the Callaway decision, but not necessarily the further expansion in
1977, upon which the Court in Riverside Bayview rested its
132
decision.
As discussed earlier, both the 1975 and the 1977
versions of the Corps’s regulations include wetlands regulation, the
difference being how wetlands are defined. Recognizing this,
Jackson and Nitze do not argue that the Riverside Bayview Court was
wrong per se—they simply argue that it was wrong for the Court to
“cryptically [conclude] that [the 1977 regulation] could serve as a
regulatory springboard for further expansions in regulatory
authority over adjacent wetlands [such as in Pozsgai and
133
Hoffman].”
b.

Arguments in Support of Pozsgai and Hoffman

The Jackson and Nitze article is a wonderful illustration of the
position of those in the judiciary who would seek to limit the
Corps’s jurisdiction at something less than the full power of the
Commerce Clause; it is also an illustrative contrast to the position
asserted in this Article. The principal difference is the focus on
130. See supra Part III.A.
131. See Jackson & Nitze, supra note 127, at 36–38. Arguing that the 1977
regulations are not supported by Congress also impliedly argues that Pozsgai and
Hoffman were wrongly decided.
132. See id. at 34–38 (discussing various congressional proposals in 1977 that
would have contracted or expanded the Corps’s jurisdiction, resulting in a
compromise scheme that the authors contend accepted the 1975 post-Callaway
interpretation, although not specifically so stating). They remarked that
[t]he [Riverside Bayview Court] reviewed much of this legislative
history . . . when it recognized that “Congress in 1977 acquiesced in the
Corps’s definition of waters as including adjacent wetlands. . . .” In doing
so, the Supreme Court appears to have misapplied the 1977 legislative
history. A better reading of this history is that Congress intended to ratify
the Corps’s 1975 regulations and not the 1977 regulations.
Id. at 37–38.
133. Id. at 38.
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congressional intent; both Riverside Bayview and Jackson and Nitze
are interpreting the same legislative history, and both come to
plausible, though opposite conclusions. As discussed, legislative
history can often be molded to fit a wide variety of contrary
conclusions. But as this Article has endeavored to show, in the area
of environmental regulation, judicial decisions have always followed
a broad statutory interpretation; in fact, congressional intent has
134
often been abandoned in favor of environmental protection.
Therefore, a focus on congressional intent can lead to an arguably
erroneous conclusion. The analyses of all of the waters/wetlands
cases up to this point have involved public policy arguments;
therefore, proper case analysis involves an application of this liberal
precedent to the facts at hand. With this in mind, the most logical
conclusion is that Pozsgai and Hoffman were correctly decided
because of the damage that could result if the federal government
did not have the ability to regulate such wetlands, and because they
represent a continuation in the long-standing trend or precedent
of liberal environmental jurisprudence.
Most courts post-Riverside Bayview agreed with this position.
There were also calls for even further expansion of federal
135
jurisdiction over wetlands.
An article by Dennis J. Priolo argued
that after the 1977 amendments, the Corps possessed the power to
regulate isolated wetlands that exhibit site-specific impacts (i.e., no
136
hydrologic connection) on interstate commerce.
The Hoffman
137
line of cases, at least with respect to migratory birds, did seem to
lend credence to this argument. Furthermore, Priolo argued that
138
the “cumulative effect” doctrine as applied in Pozsgai gave the
Corps power to regulate all isolated wetlands, regardless of whether
134. That is not to say that congressional intent arguments should be
completely abandoned; rather, they should be made in light of the purpose and
history of waters/wetlands legislation and jurisprudence.
135. See generally Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 91
(1995).
136. See id. at 96–100. The author uses Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d
354 (9th Cir. 1990), in addition to Hoffman, to support this proposition. Leslie Salt
was also a case involving migratory birds. “The Commerce Clause power, and thus
the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extent the Corps’s jurisdiction to local
water which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species.”
Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
137. E.g., Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 354; United States v. Suarez, 846 F. Supp. 892
(D. Guam 1994); Golden Gate Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
796 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
138. See supra note 116.
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their impact was only site-specific.
Priolo’s argument, in line
with the thesis of this Article, is supported by judicial precedent
that has always interpreted water pollution legislation more broadly
than a straightforward reading of the statute might allow. The
RHA was extended by judicial interpretation to forbid many
activities that had nothing to do with refuse nor anything to do with
traditional maritime navigation, and these decisions serve as a
foundation for an argument to extend the reaches of the Corps’s
jurisdiction under the CWA to isolated wetlands.
V. THE SUDDEN HALT IN JUDICIAL PIONEERING
Tracing the decisions back through history, cases such as
Standard Oil and Republic Steel demonstrate a judicial effort to
expand the power of the RHA through a robust interpretation of
the act. Following these decisions, in an effort to catch up with the
times, Congress passed the CWA. History then seemed to repeat
itself, whereas this time the judiciary used the CWA as a basis for its
decisions, rather than the thoroughly outdated RHA, to increase
federal protection over water pollution, herein related to wetlands.
It would seem that Riverside Bayview, Pozsgai, and Hoffman were all
steps along the way in an ever increasing role of the federal
government in protecting our waters and wetlands. So if the
maxim that history repeats itself were to be followed again, one
might assume that the next major development in the area of
wetland regulation would either have been 1) a Supreme Court
decision upholding either “site specific” or (more aggressively)
141
“cumulative effect”
regulation of isolated or semi-isolated
139. See Priolo, supra note 135, at 100–08. In addition to Pozsgai, the author
argues that Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat quotas, although
applied to specific farmers, in the aggregate have substantial interstate affect on
the demand for wheat) and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)
(loansharking as a class of activities, although in this case purely intrastate, is
within the federal Commerce Clause power) support his proposition that any
wetland can legally be regulated by the Corps. Id. at 100–03. But there is no
discussion of the cases under the RHA that would more strongly support this
position. See supra Part III.
140. In its end, not its means. As discussed previously, this shift in argument
from policy to congressional intent or constitutional arguments may have led to
the judiciary’s change in course in recent years. Using environmental policy
arguments based on history and precedent provides a stronger argument in
support of broadly interpreting statutes and regulations, with sufficient deference
to the Corps’s determinations as experts in the field.
141. In addition to migratory birds, various theories might have been used as a
legal basis for upholding a “cumulative effect” ruling on isolated wetlands: for
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wetlands under the Commerce Clause, or 2) comprehensive
congressional legislation amending the CWA to catch-up with the
current state of judicial precedent and interpretation. Although
Congress at times did pass, or attempted to pass, various legislation
aimed at amending the CWA, none of it was very significant, at least
142
with respect to the way that the CWA made obsolete the RHA.
Thus, it seemed that Congress was not yet prepared to act, and the
role of expanding wetland jurisdiction would again fall to the
Supreme Court, at least in the short term. In 2001, the Court was
presented with an excellent opportunity to do just that; instead,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 majority, broke ranks with
over 100 years of legal precedent in a decision that left many
wetlands practitioners scratching their heads.
A. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers
1.

Factual Background

The case of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
143
States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) arose out of northern
Illinois in the late 1990s. SWANCC was a municipal corporation
that owned 533 acres of a former gravel-mining pit, which it
intended to convert into a repository for non-hazardous waste that
144
could not be otherwise disposed of or recycled.
To convert the
land into its intended purpose, SWANCC had to fill in a large
145
section of it.
Because approximately 17.6 acres of the parcel
contained large surface depressions that held rainwater and other
precipitation, SWANCC initially asked the Corps to determine
146
whether its property contained any apparent wetlands. Although
example, effects on the water table (the underground water level that mixes and
migrates after rainfall) that may affect regional water quality. Using arguments
based on concrete, hydrological physics, rather than the particular fancy of a
species of birds, adds credibility to the Commerce Clause argument in support of
broad Corps jurisdiction, continuing the liberal trend, and it makes more difficult
for critics to attack the argument as tangential.
142. See GROSS & DODGE, supra note 22, at 11–14 (discussing various reform
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s).
143. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
144. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 998 F. Supp. 946, 948 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
145. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 191 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
146. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 948.
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the Corps initially determined it did not have jurisdiction, an
147
inquiry from the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission led the
Corps to reevaluate the site and require SWANCC to apply for a
148
section 404 permit.
Specifically, it was inquired whether the
SWANCC property might be subject to federal jurisdiction because
four different species of migratory birds had been observed there
in the past. The Corps eventually denied SWANCC’s two permit
149
150
applications, and litigation ensued.
2.

Opinion per Chief Justice Rehnquist
151

Because the two lower court opinions

used almost identical

147. For further information on this agency, see Illinois Nature Preserves
Commission Homepage, http://dnr.state.il.us/INPC/index.htm (last visited Jan.
31, 2007).
148. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 948–49. The migratory bird presence is in
reference to 33 C.F.R. section 328.3(a)(3)(i) (1987):
All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie
potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign
commerce including any such waters [that] are or could be used by
interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes . . . .
The Corps interpreted this section as “including the following waters: [those
w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird
Treaties . . . or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines . . . .” 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
149. The Supreme Court’s opinion in SWANCC elaborates on this denial:
Despite SWANCC’s securing the required water quality certification from
the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Corps refused to issue
a [section] 404(a) permit. The Corps found that SWANCC had not
established that its proposal was the least environmentally damaging,
most predictable alternative for disposal of nonhazardous solid waste;
that SWANCC’s failure to set aside sufficient funds to remediate leaks
posed an unacceptable risk to the public’s drinking water supply; and
that the impact of the project upon area-sensitive species was
unmitigatable since a landfill surface cannot be redeveloped into a
forested habitat.
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U. S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 165 (2001).
150. SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 949. The Corps, after conducting an on-site
survey, found several species of avian and waterfowl and various species of flora
and avifauna. Id. at 953. The district court opinion contained the most objective
and factual description of the land in question; but on appeal, the Seventh Circuit
described the land as “an attractive woodland vegetated by approximately 170
different species of plants,” SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 848, while the Supreme Court’s
majority opinion described the land as “an abandoned sand and gravel pit,”
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162. From these descriptions alone, one need not strain
oneself much to figure out for which party each appellate court ruled.
151. See SWANCC, 191 F.3d at 845; SWANCC, 998 F. Supp. at 946.
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reasoning to reach the same conclusion—that the Corps had
jurisdiction over SWANCC land pursuant to the Migratory Bird
Rule—and because only a 2-1 majority of a Fourth Circuit panel felt
152
otherwise, it seemed reasonable to assume, when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 2000, that the vast majority of circuit
precedent would be upheld. Such was not the case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the Court’s opinion by
recognizing that in Riverside Bayview, the Court had noted that the
term “navigable waters” was of limited import and that Congress
had intended, in passing the CWA, to regulate some waters that
153
would not be held navigable in The Daniel Ball sense of the term.
But the Court observed that
[i]t was the significant nexus between the wetlands and
“navigable waters” that informed our reading of the CWA
in [Riverside Bayview] . . . . In order to rule for the
respondents here, we would have to hold that the
jurisdiction of the Corps extends to ponds that are not
154
adjacent to open water.
Second, the Court addressed the congressional “acquiescence”
to the 1977 regulations by remarking that recognizing such
acquiescence should be done with extreme care, and that “failed
legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which
155
to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.”
The Court made
clear that congressional intent is not something to be merely
assumed, stating that “[t]he relationship between the actions and
inactions of the 95th Congress and the intent of the 92d Congress
152. See supra note 126.
153. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. This statement was based on the “unequivocal”
congressional acquiescence to the Corps’s regulations “interpreting the CWA to
cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.” Id. (emphasis supplied). Notice that
the Court is careful to point out what it had held that Congress acquiesced to—
only wetlands adjacent to navigable waters. This is a far cry from what the various
circuits had been saying in the previous decade, that the congressional intent was
to extend the jurisdiction of the Corps to the full extent of the Commerce Clause power.
Cf. argument made by Jackson & Nitze, supra Part IV.C.3.a.
154. 531 U.S. at 167–68. The Court’s language here makes it seem like this
statement is shocking or unusual. Whereas in reality, courts had been upholding
such regulation for almost ten years.
155. Id. at 169–70. In a curious and confusing passage of dicta, Chief Justice
Rehnquist commented that the Corps had put forward no persuasive evidence that
the original 1972 interpretation was out of line the congressional intent, despite the
Callaway decision and the Court’s own holding in Riverside Bayview. As to the
import of 1972 Conference Report statement that the conferees “intend that the
term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation,” the Chief Justice tersely rebutted its significance. Id. at 168, n.3.
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in passing [section] 404(a) is . . . considerably attenuated.”
The
Court thus concluded that the Corps had failed to make the
necessary showing that Congress had acquiesced to the Migratory
Bird Rule, a rule that had been promulgated almost a decade
157
earlier with no adverse congressional reaction of which to speak.
Lastly, the Court held that this was not a case where Chevron
158
deference would be appropriate, as it was in Riverside Bayview.
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that a clear indication from
Congress would be required in order to uphold an administrative
interpretation of a statute that invokes the outer limits of
159
constitutional power. The Court concluded its opinion by ruling
that the Migratory Bird Rule exceeds congressional authority
granted to the Corps, reversing the Seventh Circuit, and effectively
160
overruling the Hoffman line of cases.

156. Id. at 170.
“[S]ubsequent history is less illuminating than the
contemporaneous evidence . . . . [R]espondents face a difficult task in
overcoming the plain text and import of [Section] 404(a).” Id. The Court here is
correctly giving little weight to legislative history, but incorrectly focuses on
lexicography. It should have looked to the history and precedent under the RHA,
and should have relied more heavily on the post-CWA trend started by Riverside
Bayview.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 172.
159. Id. This concept is rooted in the long standing Supreme Court canon of
statutory construction that the Court should not “needlessly reach constitutional
issues . . . where [an] administrative interpretation alters the federal-state
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon traditional state power.” Id.
at 172–73.
160. Id. at 174. This holding was by no means unanimous. Justice Stevens,
writing for a four-Justice minority, fervently denounced the Court’s majority
opinion as contrary to the current state of the law. See id. at 174–97 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The minority essentially echoed the sentiments of the district court
and the Seventh Circuit, discussed above, adding a comprehensive discussion of
CWA legislative history to support the proposition that the “‘major purpose’ of the
CWA was ‘to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water
pollution’” and that the goals of the CWA “have nothing to do with navigation at
all.” Id. at 179, 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Although the majority did not reach the Commerce Clause question, the
dissent would have upheld the rule under the broader cumulative effect doctrine,
thereby extending the holding in Pozsgai. See id. at 192–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See also discussion of Pozsgai, supra Part IV.C.1. Justice Stevens’s opinion did an
excellent job looking past semantics and ambiguous congressional intent, focusing
on the purposes and policies that have driven forward all waters/wetlands
legislation and judicial decisions in the past. He echoed these same opinions,
though in a slightly different context, in his dissenting opinion in Rapanos. See
infra Part V.C.3.c.
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Analysis

Even though the majority opinion in SWANCC makes it very
clear that the Migratory Bird Rule is not a permissible
interpretation of the CWA, it does very little else to shed light on
what are the limits of the Corps’s jurisdiction. In the past, many
Supreme Court decisions have set forth a test or guidelines of some
sort that would allow courts in the future to make appropriate
rulings in that particular area of law. SWANCC does not even
attempt to do this. The lack of guidance in SWANCC may be due to
the fact that wetlands law originates primarily from the CWA and a
common-law test might therefore be inappropriate. Support for
this argument is found in various parts of the opinion, which
almost seemed to beg Congress for an answer or clarification on
what its true intent was in 1972, and more importantly in 1977. But
this approach is markedly different from past rulings. As this
Article has attempted to show, the Supreme Court, and the federal
court system in general, have largely taken the initiative by pushing
Congress to act on more comprehensive environmental legislation
through their broad interpretations of both RHA and CWA.
For whatever reason, the SWANCC Court was uncomfortable
with this precedent of over 100 years, and decided to take the
161
opposite approach—giving the CWA a “miserly construction” in a
possible attempt to urge Congress to act.
Such a narrow
construction might force Congress to state that it did in fact intend
for the CWA to reach the full extent of the Commerce Clause, or
whatever variation short thereof that it desired, by enacting new
legislation.
So, after 100 years of activism, did the Court truly wish to make
further rulings in a minimalistic fashion, or was the Court simply
expressing a “one-time” dissatisfaction with a rule that it found
particularly offensive? Or, perhaps, the Migratory Bird Rule
pushed federal wetlands regulation too far, too fast? After all, the
RHA had been around for almost seventy years when the rulings in
Standard Oil and Republic Steel were handed down, whereas the
Migratory Bird Rule appeared after barely fifteen years of the
CWA’s existence. Yet another potential motivator might have been
that the problem of environmental pollution is no longer as dire as
it was in the 1960s (many would argue with this point, but it must
be conceded that, for example, the Cuyahoga River no longer
161.

SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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162

possesses the same flammable qualities that it did in 1969).
B. The Aftermath of SWANCC

Soon after the SWANCC decision was published, these same
questions began to plague the federal courts. The issue in
Pozsgai—whether wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable water
were within the Corps’s jurisdiction—suddenly became litigable
once again. As these new tributary cases began to pop up across
the country, the circuits were given an opportunity to add their
own gloss to SWANCC; that is, whether they felt that decision truly
represented a shift away from judicial activism in wetlands
regulation.
Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District is a typical postSWANCC tributary case that represents the majority sentiment
163
among the circuits.
The case involved a question of jurisdiction
over lands parallel and adjacent to irrigation canals, which
164
eventually connected to traditionally navigable waters. The court
read the opinion in SWANCC as limited to “intrastate waters with
no connection to any navigable waters, but which were or would be
used as habitat by migratory birds,” contrasting the irrigation canals
by describing them as “not ‘isolated waters’ such as those that the
[Supreme Court] concluded were outside the jurisdiction of the
165
Clean Water Act.”
The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, appears to be
the only circuit that took the opposite approach. In re Needham was
an oil spill case where the tributary in question was a drainage ditch
in southern Louisiana that eventually emptied into the Gulf of
166
Mexico.
In concluding that these waters were not subject to
federal regulation as navigable waters, the court expressed a
sentiment similar to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in SWANCC:
“[T]he regulatory definition, if applied in this fashion, would push
the [jurisdictional bounds] to the outer limits of the Commerce
167
Clause and raise serious constitutional questions.”
Thus, the
circuit courts of appeal were unable to reach a post-SWANCC
consensus on the question of whether tributaries of navigable
162. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
163. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
164. Id. at 533.
165. Id.
166. 354 F.3d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 2003).
167. Id. at 345 n.8. As in SWANCC, the Fifth Circuit here declined to extend
Chevron deference to the regulation. Id.
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waters were also themselves navigable waters, hence subjecting any
168
adjacent wetlands to CWA regulation.
Despite all of the possible implications of SWANCC and its
effects on the Corps’s jurisdiction, the Corps itself did not seem to
think much of the decision. In fact, the Corps read SWANCC very
narrowly, and reaffirmed its commitment to its “no net loss of
169
wetlands” policy. The Corps also announced new regulations for
its field staff to follow when assessing CWA issues, the only changes
being that they could no longer use the Migratory Bird Rule, and
that they should seek permission from headquarters before
170
pursuing action against other non-navigable intrastate waters.
Based on these facts it does not seem that the Corps felt that
section 328.3(a) was affected at all; the Corps merely treated its
Migratory Bird Rule interpretation of that section as void and did
168. Judge Snyder in United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d
1180, 1183–84 (C.D. Cal. 2004), notes a significant circuit split in decisions
applying SWANCC. Although no true consensus was reached, most cases seemed
to correctly interpret past waters/wetlands precedent and decided to construe
SWANCC narrowly. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2006)
(construing SWANCC narrowly; cranberry bogs adjacent to tributaries were subject
to the Corps’s jurisdiction); Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 425 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (construing SWANCC narrowly; Corps’s
jurisdiction did not depend on existence of actual hydrological or ecological
connection); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)
(construing SWANCC narrowly; consent decree concerning wetlands adjacent to
tributaries not affected). It is important to note that, had SWANCC set forth some
sort of jurisdictional test, much of this litigation would likely not have been
necessary.
169. See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Administration to
Reaffirm Commitment to No Net Loss of Wetlands and Address Approach for
Protecting Isolated Waters in Light of Supreme Court Ruling on Jurisdictional
Issues (Jan. 10, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/
newsreleases .htm (follow “By Date: 2003” hyperlink; then follow “Earlier Releases”
hyperlink repeatedly until reaching “01/10/2003”; then follow hyperlink to the
release) (announcing actions that “reaffirm federal authority over the vast majority
of America’s wetlands”).
170. The Corps gave the following instructions to its field staff:
Field staff should continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional
navigable waters (and adjacent wetlands) and, generally speaking, their
tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands). In light of SWANCC, field staff
should not assert CWA jurisdiction over isolated waters that are both
intrastate and non-navigable, where the sole basis available for asserting
CWA jurisdiction rests on any of the factors listed in the “Migratory Bird
Rule.” In light of SWANCC, field staff should seek formal project-specific
HQ approval prior to asserting jurisdiction over isolated non-navigable
intrastate waters based on other types of interstate commerce links listed
in current regulatory definitions of “waters of the U.S.”
Id.
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not make any formal amendment to its regulations.
The Corps’s reaction to the SWANCC decision is
understandable in light of the fact that it had always, up until 2001,
largely enjoyed the support and backing of the judiciary to make its
own decisions and interpretations. The Corps likely felt that
SWANCC was something of an anomaly, and that further judgments
would vindicate its right to assert broad jurisdiction over wetlands.
After all, the Corps had been directly in charge of water/wetlands
since the RHA was first passed, and it therefore had a better
perspective than any other branch of government to see that the
judiciary had always been pioneering and held more regard for
environmental concerns than for congressional intent. It is likely
that the Corps was unsure how to proceed after the SWANCC
opinion and felt that it was best to “wait and see” what the courts
would do next. In fact, most of the reported decisions after
SWANCC appear to be (arguably) correctly decided. Most decisions
followed the spirit of the previous hundred years of precedent and
either distinguished SWANCC or limited it to its facts. Decisions
like Needham appear to be limited to the Fifth Circuit. Although
these circuit decisions post-SWANCC did provide some degree of
guidance, the Corps did not have to wait long for the Supreme
Court to again weigh in on the issue.
C. Rapanos v. United States
1.

Factual Background
172

Rapanos v. United States came before the Supreme Court as a
consolidation of two separate Sixth Circuit cases with nearly
173
identical facts: Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. United States
174
Army Corps of Engineers.
a.

Rapanos

In the first case, Rapanos was a land developer in Bay,
171. The Corps only paid lip service to the Supreme Court’s decision, stating
that “[w]e are committed to protecting America’s wetlands and watersheds to the
full extent under the Clean Water Act and the recent Supreme Court ruling. We
are also committed to full public involvement in this process, and we will seek
additional information and scientific data for possible rulemaking.” Id. But this
rulemaking never occurred.
172. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
173. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
174. 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
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175

Midland, and Saginaw Counties in Michigan.
In the late 1980s
and early 1990s, he began to fill in parts of his lands in preparation
for construction, despite the advice of the state and an
independent consultant, who had noted the presence of a
176
significant number of acres of wetlands on the properties.
After
the Corps discovered that Rapanos had been filling wetlands in
violation of the CWA, and after Rapanos ignored various orders
from the Corps to cease and desist, over a decade of criminal and
177
civil litigation ensued.
b.

Carabell

In the second case, the Carabells were land developers who
owned approximately twenty acres in Chesterfield Township,
178
Macomb County, Michigan, near Lake Saint Clair, which they
179
sought to fill and develop into a condominium complex.
In
2000, the Carabells applied to the Corps for, and were denied, a
section 404 permit to add over 50,000 cubic yards of fill material to
180
their land.
The Corps reasoned that “the operation and use of
the proposed activity would have major, long term, negative
impacts on water quality, on terrestrial wildlife, on the wetlands, on
181
conservation, and on the overall ecology of the area.”
The
Carabells eventually brought suit arguing that “the Corps lacked
regulatory jurisdiction over the property because [it was] isolated
182
from all outside waters.”
Geographically speaking, the Rapanos
and Carabell wetlands were all adjacent to tributaries of traditional
navigable waters; hence, they were not directly adjacent to
traditionally navigable waters, as in Riverside Bayview, but they also
were not so isolated as to have no direct hydrological connection at
183
As discussed above, it was
all to navigable waters as in SWANCC.
175. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 632–33.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 633–34.
178. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 705. Recall that the wetlands in question in Riverside
Bayview were located a similar distance from Lake St. Clair. The difference in
disposition is due to the fact that Riverside Bayview, unlike Carabell, involved a
portion of wetlands that directly abutted a navigable-in-fact creek. Rapanos, 126
S. Ct. at 2240 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
179. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 705.
180. Id. at 706.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 707.
183. In Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals described the land as
follows:
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these types of wetlands that had caused the post-SWANCC rift
between the Fifth Circuit and the rest of the courts of appeals.
2.

On Appeal at the Sixth Circuit

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the right of the Corps to
exercise jurisdiction in each case, distinguishing SWANCC on its
facts. The Carabell court concluded on the authority of section
328.3(a) that, as a factual matter, the wetlands in question were
184
The Rapanos court
adjacent to waters of the United States.
reached a similar conclusion and recognized that in light of
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, what constitutes an adjacent
185
wetland is still debatable.
Although both courts recognized that
the holding in SWANCC had removed from federal jurisdiction
some isolated wetlands, they chose to follow the majority of courts
in reading SWANCC narrowly—as excising only the Migratory Bird
186
Rule.
Furthermore, both courts found that SWANCC did not
alter Riverside Bayview, and that the Riverside Bayview nexus
extended not only to wetlands directly adjacent to navigable waters,
187
but also to wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters.
The Rapanos court also commented that Congress clearly
envisioned that CWA jurisdiction would extend to wetlands with a

[T]he Salzburg wetlands have a surface water connection to tributaries of
the Kawkawlin River, which in turn, flows into the Saginaw River and
ultimately into Lake Huron. . . . [T]he Hines Road site [has] a surface
water connection to the Rose Drain which, in turn, has a surface water
connection to the Tittabawassee River. . . . [T]he Pine River site [has] a
surface water connection to the Pine River, which flows into Lake Huron.
376 F.3d at 642–43. In Carabell, the Sixth Circuit described the land by noting:
[There is a] berm edging the Carabells’ property [that] serves to block
immediate drainage of surface water out of the parcel into [a] ditch. . . .
At the northeastern corner of the property, the ditch connects to the
Sutherland-Oemig Drain, which empties into the Auvase Creek, which
empties into Lake St. Clair, which is part of the Great Lakes drainage
system.
391 F.3d at 705.
184. Carabell, 391 F.3d at 708–09.
185. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 635, 642.
186. See Carabell, 391 F.3d at 709 (declining to follow the Needham minority,
which gave SWANCC a broader reading); Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 638–39 (citing
various circuit precedent post-SWANCC giving that decision a narrow reading).
187. See Carabell, 391 F.3d at 709–10 (noting congressional acquiescence to
regulation of adjacent wetlands); Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 639–40, 642 (affirming the
need for a hydrological connection, while refuting the “direct abutment”
requirement).
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188

hydrological connection to navigable waters.
3.

At the Supreme Court

Although a majority of five Justices voted to vacate the
opinions of the Sixth Circuit and remand the matters back to the
district court for further findings, the United States Supreme Court
was unable to agree on a definite standard or test for how to
reevaluate the two cases, or future cases that involve wetlands
adjacent to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters. Four
Justices would have limited the CWA to relatively permanent bodies
of water or wetlands whose surface area is wholly contiguous with
189
traditional waters of the United States, one Justice would have
used the “significant nexus” test—introduced by the SWANCC court
to describe the holding in Riverside Bayview—to analyze wetlands on
190
a case-by-case basis, and the other four Justices would have
upheld the right of the Corps to determine and follow their own
reasonable regulations, so long as they did not reach truly isolated
191
waters as in SWANCC.
a.

Justice Scalia’s Opinion
i.

Rejecting the Corps’s Regulations

The plurality opinion began by criticizing the Corps for not
changing their regulations after SWANCC, and further chastising
the federal judiciary for the wholesale acceptance of the Corps’s
192
broad interpretations of their jurisdiction.
Second, it entered
188. Rapanos, 376 F.3d at 640. This court also cited Chevron deference as an
alternate ground for upholding the Corps’s jurisdiction. Id. at 640–41.
189. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2214–35 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion, with whom Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito
joined).
190. See id. at 2236–52 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also supra note 154 and
accompanying quotation from SWANCC.
191. See id. at 2252–65 (Stevens, J., dissenting, with whom Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter joined).
192. See id. at 2217–19 (plurality opinion). Although SWANCC provided
almost no guidance, and it did not set forth any sort of rule to be followed, Justice
Scalia nonetheless remarked:
Following our decision in SWANCC, the Corps did not significantly revise
its theory of federal jurisdiction under [section 404 of the CWA]. The
Corps provided notice of a proposed rulemaking in light of SWANCC, but
ultimately did not amend its published regulations. . . . Even after
SWANCC, the lower courts have continued to uphold the Corps’s
sweeping assertions of jurisdiction over ephemeral channels and drains
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into an extended discussion of what constitutes waters of the
United States, first recognizing the holding in Riverside Bayview that
the meaning of navigable waters is broader than the traditional
193
understanding, although not devoid of significance.
Justice
Scalia argued that the Corps’s expansive interpretation of navigable
waters cannot be upheld because: (1) the dictionary definition of
194
waters does not support the conclusion, (2) the plain language of
195
(3) the term
the statute does not support the conclusion,
196
navigable waters carries some of its original significance, (4) the
CWA uses an alternate term, “point source,” to include the
geographical features that the Corps would erroneously include
197
within navigable waters, (5) the limited definition of waters of the
as tributaries. . . . These judicial constructions of “tributaries” are not
outliers. Rather, they reflect the breadth of the Corps’s determinations
in the field.
Id. at 2217–18 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia particularly focused on the fact
that “adjacency” had taken on an over-extended meaning. See id. at 2218–19
(citing and criticizing much of the post-SWANCC precedent).
193. Id. at 2220.
194. Although Justice Scalia was able to use the dictionary for an argument in
his favor (reproduced in part in this note), Justice Kennedy used the same
dictionary to support his opinion. See id. at 2242–43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Corps’s expansive approach might be arguable if the CWA defined
“navigable waters” as “water of the United States.” But “the waters of the
United States” is something else. The use of the definite article (“the”)
and the plural number (“waters”) show plainly that [the CWA definition]
does not refer to water in general. In this form, “the waters” refers more
narrowly to water “[a]s found in streams and bodies forming
geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,” or “the flowing
or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or
bodies.”
Id. at 2220–21 (quoting from WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d
ed. 1954)).
195. “[T]he Corps has stretched the term ‘waters of the United States’ beyond
parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize this ‘Land is
Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 2222. This statement seems
contrary to the Court’s opinion in Standard Oil and Republic Steel. See supra Part
III.C.
196. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (comparing the meaning as used in the
Daniel Ball, Riverside Bayview, and SWANCC).
197. This is the first time any court had suggested that wetlands regulation was
a wholly separate subject from waters regulation in general; most courts have read
these sections in pari materia without hesitation, as there is nothing (besides this
opinion) to suggest that they were meant to be separate regulatory spheres. In
fact, many of the same statutory definitions apply to both sections. Nonetheless,
the plurality argued that:
Most significant of all, the CWA itself categorizes the channels and
conduits that typically carry intermittent flows of water separately from
“navigable waters,” by including them in the definition of “‘point
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United States is consistent with federalism and states’ rights, and
(6) the Supreme Court canons of construction require a “‘clear
and manifest’ statement from Congress to authorize an
unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority” or “an
agency theory of jurisdiction that presses the envelope of
199
constitutional validity.”
Rather, Justice Scalia argued that the
proper interpretation of “waters of the United States” is “only those
relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of
water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary
200
parlance as streams[,] . . . oceans, rivers, and lakes.”
ii. Issues of Adjacency
The plurality then discussed its discontent with the growing
body of federal precedent that wetlands may be considered
adjacent to navigable waters because of a remote hydrologic
201
connection.
They argued that Riverside Bayview only recognized
wetlands as waters to a limited extent, allowing agency deference in
source.’” . . . The definitions thus conceive of “point sources” and
“navigable waters” as separate and distinct categories. . . . The separate
classification of “ditch[es], channel[s], and conduit[s]”—which are terms
ordinarily used to describe the watercourses through which intermittent
waters typically flow—shows that these are, by and large, not “waters of
the United States.”
Id. at 2222–23.
198. Ignoring the pre-CWA history that the states were simply unable or
unwilling to regulate water pollution under the 1948 FWPCA, the plurality
commented that:
[T]he foregoing definition of “waters” is consistent with the CWA’s stated
“policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources . . . .”
[Clean Water Act § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)]. But the
expansive theory advanced by the Corps, rather than “preserv[ing] the
primary rights and responsibilities of the States,” would have brought
virtually all “plan[ning of] the development and use . . . of land and
water resources” by the States under federal control. It is therefore an
unlikely reading of the phrase “the waters of the United States.”
Id. at 2223–24.
199. See id. at 2224 (“Regulation of land use, as through the issuance of the
development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a
quintessential state and local power, . . . [and] the Corps’s interpretation stretches
the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power . . . .”).
200. Id. at 2225.
201. See id. at 2225–27 (noting, however, the “inherent ambiguity in drawing
the boundaries of any ‘waters’”).
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202

that case because of the difficulty in delineating boundaries.
They also rejected the formulation that wetlands “in reasonable
proximity” to navigable waters or wetlands that have an “ecological
connection” to navigable waters is sufficient to bring them within
203
the jurisdiction of the CWA.
The plurality concluded that “only
those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that
are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right . . . [are]
covered by the [CWA],” while those “with only an intermittent,
physically remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the United
204
States’ . . . lack the necessary connection.”
iii.

Refuting Environmental Concerns

The plurality then addressed some of the concerns raised at
oral argument that a curtailment of the Corps’s jurisdiction over
wetlands would have ramifications across the board on all types of
205
environmental pollution.
They reasoned that the dredged/fill
material typically used to fill wetlands is different from pollutants in
that dredged/fill material is stationary, while other pollutants are
206
mobile.
They also asserted that the preservation of wetlands is

202. See id. at 2225–26 (“[T]he [Corps] could reasonably conclude that a
wetland that ‘adjoin[ed]’ waters of the United States is itself a part of those
waters.”).
203. Id. at 2226 n.10. Even though SWANCC can, at best, only be read as
rejecting a single ecological consideration, the Migratory Bird Rule, the plurality
made the sweeping assertion that “the most natural reading of [Riverside Bayview]
is that a wetlands’ mere ‘reasonable proximity’ to waters of the United States is not
enough to confer Corps jurisdiction.” Id. “[Furthermore], SWANCC rejected the
notion that the ecological considerations . . . [provide] an independent basis for
including entries like ‘wetlands’ (or ‘ephemeral streams’) within the phrase ‘the
waters of the United States.’ SWANCC found such ecological considerations
irrelevant . . . .” Id. at 2226.
204. Id. at 2226.
205. Id. at 2227–28.
206. Chevron held that the judiciary is not in as good of a position as Congress
or the Executive to make scientific decisions that require background knowledge
or expertise—hence, deference is appropriate. But the plurality here took it upon
themselves to base their opinion on their own interpretation of the ecological and
hydrological science involved:
“[D]redged or fill material,” which is typically deposited for the sole
purpose of staying put, does not normally wash downstream, and thus
does not normally constitute an “addition . . . to navigable waters” when
deposited in upstream isolated wetlands. . . . [while] the deposit of mobile
pollutants into upstream ephemeral channels is naturally described [as
such] . . . .
Id. at 2228, 2228 n.11.
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207

not one of the goals of the CWA.

iv. The Judgment of the Court
The plurality opinion concluded by vacating the decisions of
the Sixth Circuit and remanding for a determination whether
“[f]irst, . . . the adjacent channel contains a ‘wate[r] of the United
States,’” as Justice Scalia has described it; and second, whether “the
wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water,
making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the
208
‘wetland’ begins.”
b.

Justice Kennedy’s Opinion
i.

The “Significant Nexus” Test
209

Justice Kennedy began his opinion
by identifying the
“significant nexus” test as the basis of his argument, relying on
210
Riverside Bayview and SWANCC as definitive support for the test.
Taken together [Riverside Bayview and SWANCC] establish
that in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview,
the connection between a nonnavigable water or wetland
and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so
close, that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a
“navigable water” under the [CWA]. In other instances,
as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no
207. See id. at 2228 (“[A] Comprehensive National Wetlands Protection Act is
not before us, and the ‘wis[dom]’ of such a statute . . . is beyond our ken. What is
clear, however, is that Congress did not enact one when it granted the Corps
jurisdiction over only ‘the waters of the United States.’”). What is more “clear,”
however, is that most other courts, at least in part, have disagreed with this
assertion.
208. Id. at 2227, 2235. The only controlling aspect of the main opinion was
that the cases should be vacated and remanded. Justice Scalia’s determinative
considerations on remand are no more binding than anything else in his opinion.
It also deserves mention that Chief Justice Roberts, in a brief opinion concurring
with the plurality, chastised the Corps in stronger terms for not having rewritten
their regulations post-SWANCC, stating that although “[i]t is unfortunate that no
opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress’s
limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act, . . . [t]he upshot today is another
defeat for the agency.” Id. at 2235–36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
209. Although the opinion concurs in the result, the majority of the text is
spent rejecting the arguments that Justice Scalia made.
210. Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236, 2240–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“[T]o constitute ‘navigable waters’ under the [CWA], a water or
wetland must possess a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in
fact or that could reasonably be so made.”).
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connection. Absent a significant nexus, jurisdiction under
211
the [CWA] is lacking.
To this end, he took issue with the plurality’s description of
wetlands in that it seemed to use a dismissive tone with respect to
the importance of wetlands because, if wetlands did not have an
ecological role to play with respect to traditionally navigable waters,
212
there could never be a significant nexus between the two.
ii. Justice Kennedy’s Recommendations
Justice Kennedy then presented the Corps with two
alternatives: it could either (1) rewrite its regulations to specifically
exclude such things as “drains, ditches, and streams remote from
any navigable-in-fact water” or, (2) “[a]bsent more specific
regulations . . . the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a
case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on
213
adjacency to non-navigable tributaries.”
He reasoned that his
solution to the problem will prevent constitutional Commerce
Clause or federalism difficulties, and that it will avoid problematic
214
applications of the statute.
Justice Kennedy concluded his
opinion by pointing out some facts from both the Rapanos and
Carabell cases that might be used to support a significant nexus
finding upon remand, in addition to pieces of evidence that are
215
lacking and might be further developed.
211. Id. at 2241.
212. See id. at 2237–38 (“Contrary to the plurality’s description . . . wetlands are
not simply moist patches of earth.”).
213. Id. at 2249.
214. Id. at 2249–50.
215. The facts Justice Kennedy highlighted in Rapanos were:
An expert . . . testified that the wetlands were providing “habitat,
sediment trapping, nutrient recycling, and flood peak diminution” . . . .
[T]he District Court made extensive findings regarding water tables and
drainage on the parcels at issue. . . . [E]stablishment of a significant
nexus . . . [might be] supplemented by further evidence about the
significance of the tributaries to which the wetlands are connected.
Id. at 2250. The facts he identified from the Carabell case were:
The Corps noted . . . “that the project would have a major, long-term
detrimental effect on wetlands, flood retention, recreation and
conservation and overall ecology” . . . . The conditional language in [the
Corps’s assessment]—“potential ability,” “possible flooding”—could
suggest an undue degree of speculation, and a reviewing court must
identify substantial evidence . . . . [T]he record does show that factors
relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry have already been noted and
considered. . . . [T]he Corps based its jurisdiction solely on the wetlands’
adjacency to the ditch opposite the berm on the property’s edge, [which
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Justice Stevens’ Opinion

The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, would
have sustained the authority of the Corps to continue asserting
jurisdiction over all wetlands adjacent to tributaries in conformance
with its regulations. It criticized Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as
failing to defer sufficiently to the Corps, though recognizing that
he was far more faithful to precedent and principles of statutory
interpretation; it dismissed Justice Scalia’s “creative” criticisms as
disregarding the “nature of the congressional delegation to the
agency and the technical and complex character of the issues at
216
stake.”
i.

Relying on Riverside Bayview, Dismissing SWANCC

In the view of the dissenting Justices, the Corps’s
determination that “wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally
navigable waters preserve the quality of our Nation’s waters . . .
[was] a quintessential example of the Executive’s reasonable
217
They would have relied
interpretation of a statutory provision.”
wholly on Riverside Bayview because they felt that the question
presented, and answered in the affirmative there, included such
wetlands adjacent to tributaries as were at issue in the present
218
case.
Furthermore, the dissent did not read Riverside Bayview to
include a surface connection requirement because that opinion’s
mention of such a connection was made in the context of a
219
statement of approval, rather than a steadfast requirement.
The
dissent reasoned that, as a class, the majority of wetlands have a
is not a strong enough connection].
Id. at 2251–52.
216. Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion most closely
follows the ideas developed in this Article.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2255 (“Although the particular wetland at issue in Riverside Bayview
abutted a navigable creek, we framed the question presented as whether the Clean
Water Act ‘authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the
Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies
of waters and their tributaries.’”). This statement observes the broad holding in
Riverside Bayview, and it further supports the conclusion that the Court was wrong
to restrict the Corps’s authority in SWANCC and in the present case.
219. Id. at 2255–56 (“Contrary to the plurality’s revisionist reading today, . . .
Riverside Bayview nowhere implied that our approval of ‘adjacent’ wetlands was
contingent upon an understanding that ‘adjacent’ means having a ‘continuous
surface connection’ between the wetland and its neighboring [navigable
waters] . . . .”).
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great impact on the environment, and therefore deserve to be
protected, while the minority of less significant wetlands may simply
220
be developed through the section 404 permitting process.
They
also placed significance on the 1977 congressional session that
discussed, but failed to pass an amendment specifically limiting the
221
Corps’s jurisdiction.
The dissent dismissed the plurality’s
reliance on the holding in SWANCC as not on point because it dealt
with a question specifically reserved in Riverside Bayview, namely,
222
the Corps’s jurisdiction over isolated waters.
ii. Refuting Economic Concerns
The dissent then shifted its focus to general economic
concerns that the wetlands permitting process is too time
consuming and expensive, noting that “[t]he Corps approves
virtually all section 404 permit[s], though often requiring
applicants to avoid or mitigate impacts to wetlands and other
223
waters.” It attempted to put the seemingly high cost in context by
showing that wetland expenditures constitute “only a small fraction
of 1% of the $760 billion spent each year on private and public
224
construction and development activity.” The dissent also refuted
the plurality’s charge that its opinion was “policy-laden” by showing
that the policies expressed were Congress’s, rather than Justice
225
Stevens’s.
iii. Judicial Deference
Justice Stevens then expressed his view that any intervention
that would restrict the Corps’s jurisdiction is not within the purview
of the judiciary and should be addressed by Congress:
Whether the benefits of particular conservation measures
outweigh their costs is a classic question of public policy
that should not be answered by appointed judges. The
fact that large investments are required to finance large
developments merely means that those who are most
adversely affected by the Corps’s permitting decisions are
220. Id. at 2256.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2258 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Id. at 2258–59 (questioning the impartiality of the plurality’s exaggerated
concern about cost that fails to recognize the benefits that the CWA has provided).
225. Id. at 2259 n.8. Justice Stevens’s opinion hits the mark by identifying
policy as the paramount consideration.
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persons who have the ability to communicate effectively
with their representatives. Unless and until they succeed
in convincing Congress (or the Corps) that clean water is
less important today than it was in the 1970’s [sic], we
continue to owe deference to regulations satisfying the
“evident breadth of congressional concern for protection
226
of water quality and aquatic ecosystems . . . .”
4.

Deciphering the Holding

To many, the Rapanos decision was even more confusing than
227
Observers questioned whether
the SWANCC decision.
landowners might have an easier time getting a permit from the
228
Corps, or whether only the existing nomenclature would change.
In 1977, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on how to handle a
229
The rule states that when a majority of the
plurality decision.
Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on
the ground for that outcome, lower-court judges are to follow the
narrowest ground to which a majority of the justices would have
230
assented if forced to choose.
Therefore, in considering what it
would take to achieve a majority of five Justices, courts have to
determine where the “middle ground” is. Clearly, this is Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, because it rejects the plurality’s narrow
interpretation while using the “significant nexus” test to somewhat
restrict the dissent’s broad interpretation. Therefore, any decision
that uses Justice Kennedy’s test to uphold jurisdiction would not
gain the support of the four plurality Justices, but would likely gain
the support of the four dissenting Justices because it is the “next
best option” if they were forced to choose; hence, there would be a
five-Justice majority. If jurisdiction were rejected, the inverse would
231
be true.
Since June 2006, there have been a handful of decisions that
discuss Rapanos; all but one of them have reached the conclusion
that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test will be controlling
226. Id. at 2259.
227. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Lawyers, Developers Puzzle over Wetlands Case,
5 NO. 25 A.B.A. J. E-REP. 3 (June 23, 2006) (“There’s a developing consensus that
things are probably more confusing now than before the opinion was issued. . . .”).
228. Id.
229. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
230. Id. at 193.
231. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25 (7th Cir.
2006), for a detailed description of the deductive reasoning required under Marks
to reach the conclusion that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is controlling.
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232

from now on.
Whether the trend continues is anyone’s guess,
and until there is a larger body of post-Rapanos precedent, lawyers
and developers will have to feel their way through these
jurisprudential uncertainties on a case-by-case basis. It is important
to keep in mind, though, that in the context of the 100 years or
more of precedent in waters/wetlands law, Rapanos is “just a turn in
233
a long and winding road.”
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Tracing the steps back through history, the progressive and
“pioneering” trend in waters/wetlands jurisprudence should now
be clear. First, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of
navigable waters to include waters that are purely intrastate when
they have linked effects on interstate commerce. Second, over the
course of seventy years, the federal courts gradually expanded and
stretched, with little regard to congressional intent, the
interpretation of the RHA from a purely navigational statute to a
comprehensive water pollution prevention tool, culminating in two
232. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2006)
(discharging fill material into a cranberry bog without a permit—the court held
that the jurisdictional test was either Justice Kennedy’s test or the plurality’s
guidelines); Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724–25 (concluding that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion controls because in most cases it will command a “forced”
majority of the court, regardless of whether he finds for or against jurisdiction,
and remanding for further findings by the district court); N. Cal. River Watch v.
City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006) (controlling opinion is that of
Justice Kennedy, seepage between a pond and a river, separated by a man-made
levy, is enough to find a nexus); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Pac. Lumber Co., No.
C 01-2821 MHP, 2007 WL 43654, at *12–15 (N.D. Cal. Jan 8, 2007) (following the
significant nexus test, rejecting Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion); United States v.
Evans, No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2,
2006) (recognizing that either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test may be used
and upholding CWA jurisdiction related to a search warrant for water pollution).
But see United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (N.D.
Tex. 2006) (reasoning that because Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test was
too uncertain to follow, the court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent (Needham,
supra Part V.B) and construed the holding in Rapanos narrowly, rejecting Corps
jurisdiction).
Since the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits seem to have no
difficulty interpreting Justice Kennedy’s opinion, the decision of this district court
seems unusual, and it may be reversed or vacated—unless, of course, the Fifth
Circuit decides to continue its unusual tradition of construing federal wetlands
jurisdiction narrowly, which would be unfortunate because Texas, Louisiana, and
Mississippi have many of the most fragile and endangered inland and coastal
wetlands in the country.
233. Tebo, supra note 227.
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Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s that almost completely
abandoned the language of the statute. Third, Congress belatedly
reacted in 1972 to pass the first effective, enforceable, national
water pollution legislation, which came to be known as the CWA, in
response to the judiciary’s repeated prodding for such legislation.
The Corps then promulgated its own regulations under the new
law, which became increasingly broad throughout the 1970s and
1980s, and Congress never acted to invalidate these laws. Fourth,
the Supreme Court affirmed what had become a pattern of liberal
and broad interpretations up to that point (1985) under the CWA
and further invited the judiciary to test the bounds of the CWA
both in the language of the statute itself and under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. And fifth, the federal courts continued their
trend of expanding the Corps’s jurisdiction over the following
fifteen years, upholding such novel concepts as tributary wetland
regulation and migratory-bird-based wetland regulation.
With all of this history and precedent, the proper ruling
should have been clear to the Court in 2001 when deciding
SWANCC and in 2006 when deciding Rapanos. Instead, the Court
in both of these cases made assertions that were arguably contrary
to the state of the law. In SWANCC, these include first, the
introduction of the nebulous “significant nexus,” which is a poor
proxy for the environmental policy arguments that should inform
judges’ decisions. Second, the Court asserted that the Corps had
not made a sufficient showing that Congress had accepted its
regulations even though Congress had never acted to contravene
the Corps’s determinations in the over ten years that the
regulations had been enforced. And third, the Court refused to
give Chevron deference to the Corps’s determinations, implying that
the regulations were not a reasonable interpretation of the CWA
even though they were consistent with the ever increasing
regulatory power that the Corps had enjoyed and had come to
depend on.
In Rapanos, the plurality’s position was arguably even more
contrary to the state of the law, but fortunately because of the 4-1-4
split, it was probably not a controlling opinion. First, any negative
inference that the Court drew due to the fact that the Corps had
not changed their regulation is seemingly unjustified because the
Court had not provided a clear test in SWANCC. Second, the
plurality’s introduction of the continuous flow and continuous
surface connection requirements are unwarranted because
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nowhere in the legislation or the case law do these terms appear;
they are completely novel concepts created by the plurality, as
Justice Kennedy indicated in his opinion. Third, subjecting every
statutory word to close dictionary and lexicographic “scrutiny” does
no justice to the very real problems addressed by the CWA and that
the plurality passed over (or criticized others for considering in
their opinions). Fourth, the plurality’s excision and separation of
“point source” and “navigable waters” goes against canons of
construction that require that definitional terms be read in
connection and as complimentary to one another whenever
possible; these terms are simply definitional analogs relating to the
areas where toxins and dredged/fill material, respectively, are
deposited, and any suggestion that one is more important or more
worthy of regulation than the other is at odds with the generally
accepted ecological perspective. And fifth, the plurality’s overreliance on SWANCC and misinterpretation of Riverside Bayview
focuses too heavily on a questionable decision five years ago and
largely ignores the other 100 years of progressive precedent and
legislative and administrative action.
So if in fact SWANCC and Rapanos were wrongly decided as this
article suggests, what is the proper solution to restore the Corps’s
and the judiciary’s power as it stood before 2001? First of all, it is
clear that, at least with the current composition, the Supreme
Court is unable to provide concrete guidance on how to regulate
wetlands. SWANCC was sparsely reasoned and did not provide any
kind of future guidance. Rapanos did not even command a
majority of the Court, resulting in three long, contradictory
opinions. Therefore, the Court should refrain from accepting any
section 404 cases for at least a decade, until the courts of appeals
have had time to flesh out the current state of the law. As most
courts seem to be following Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Rapanos
and construing SWANCC narrowly, if the Supreme Court recuses
itself from this debate for a while, the future of wetlands will be
bright because most wetlands that were previously regulated likely
234
also fall within the “significant nexus.”
The trend of liberal
jurisdictional expansion, however, will be difficult to continue for
the same reasons.
Second, Congress should act to clarify what it intended the
Corps’s jurisdiction to be under the CWA. The CWA has been on
234. All that would be needed is for the Fifth Circuit to get on board with the
rest of the circuit courts of appeals.
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the books for over thirty-five years, and a comprehensive
amendment or clarification is becoming quickly overdue. Senator
Russell Feingold of Wisconsin introduced a bill in the 2005
legislative session entitled the Clean Water Authority Restoration
235
Act.
This act would do exactly what is needed in the area of
wetlands regulation consistent with the original purposes of the
CWA, but with the added benefit of eliminating any possibility of
argument against full exercise of the Corps’s authority under the
Constitution. The effect of this bill, if passed, would be to
completely supersede SWANCC and Rapanos, and it would restore
the law to where it was in the late 1990s, but without the critics and
dissenting opinions. It also has the added benefit of continual
expansion of regulation over time, parallel to the probable
expansion of congressional authority under the Commerce
236
Clause.
Third, until Senator Feingold’s legislation is (hopefully)
237
the Corps should slightly modify section 328.3(a)
passed,
regulations to exclude only those most objectionable aqueous
conduits over which the Corps had previously asserted jurisdiction
in order to avoid tempting the court system to rule against them, as
in Rapanos. If the Corps, for the time being, shows that it is willing
to at least appear to be complying with the mandates set forth by
the judiciary, judges will have less incentive and less reason to
criticize the Corps’s conduct. After all, if Rapanos stands for
anything at all, it is that the Court was unhappy with the fact that
the Corps was still operating under the same regulations five years
235. S. 912, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). The purposes of this act are as follows:
(1) To reaffirm the original intent of Congress in enacting the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the waters of
the United States.
(2) To clearly define the waters of the United States that are subject to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
(3) To provide protection to the waters of the United States to the fullest
extent of the legislative authority of Congress under the Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted). The act then goes on to specify provisions to meet each of
these goals. Id. § 3.
236. See PRENTICE & EGAN, supra note 46. But cf. United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (recognizing that the Interstate Commerce Clause is not
omnipotent, and that there still remain many areas of the law where federal
regulation is not proper).
237. In January 2007, the Democratic Party took control of the Congress,
making it more likely that a proposal such as this will be passed, or at least
considered.
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after SWANCC.
In conclusion, wetlands regulation will continue to be an
important issue that affects everyone—from permitting
requirements to drinking water quality. Wherever the state of the
law goes from here, it should keep in mind the purposes for which
the original laws were enacted and the overarching theme of the
need for strong environmental protection at the federal level, and
it should strive for realization of the no-net-loss policy. With any
luck, wetlands will be around for a long time to come to prevent
the spread of pollution, to mitigate flooding, and to provide
habitats for our nation’s many diverse and endangered species.
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